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S4 AbstractsWHO support for programme monitoring and VPD surveillance included supportive assistance and corrective feedback on the WHO-UNICEF
Joint EPI Reporting Form; development and training on data management tools for traditional and new vaccine surveillance; development of
models for monitoring/assessing low performance (at national and subnational level) and epidemiological risk for diseases like Polio and Measles;
and continuous supportive and corrective feedback on surveillance data quality. The WHO EPI Unit collaborated with other Regional Office
divisions and units to improve various aspects of VPD surveillance. VPD surveillance sensitivity was enhanced by integrating VPD surveillance
with event based surveillance training in collaboration with the Disease Surveillance and Response Unit.
Laboratory networks for poliomyelitis, measles and rubella, and Japanese encephalitis continued to provide timely and reliable laboratory
confirmation and virus identification. All poliomyelitis network laboratories and almost all measles and rubella network laboratories in the Region
are fully accredited. The polio laboratory network introduced a new algorithm/protocol that will shorten the interval between specimen collection
and virus isolation. Real time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) for the intratypic differentiation and the screening of vaccine derived polioviruses
was successfully implemented by the laboratory network during 2010. Measles and AFP surveillance and laboratory performances are being
strengthened through a series of training, feedback mechanisms and supplemental surveillance actitivities (e.g., environmental and enterovirus
surveillance for poliovirus). The WHO measles regional reference laboratory (RRL) in Hong Kong provided genotyping results for countries
including Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines and Vietnam. Regional capacity to conduct measles
genotyping was enhanced after conducting two hands on laboratory training for measles network laboratories in 2009 and 2010. A newly established
Japanese encephalitis laboratory network began to provide laboratory confirmation and implement quality assurance measures, such as proficiency
testing and confirmatory testing. The two hands-on training workshops were held in 2009 and 2010 to further improve laboratory performance and
the quality of testing.
Future directions
WHO will continue to work with national counterparts to build sustainable capacity at country level to improve immunization performance, describe
and respond to epidemiological risk of vaccine preventable diseases, and enhance synergies between immunization and other health programmes.
WHO will support routine immunization system strengthening and assist members states in achieving global and regional disease eradication,
elimination and control goals as well as Millennium Development Goals and goals contained within the Global Immunization Vision and Strategy.
External certification and verification commissions and expert resource panels will be used increasingly to not only monitor and validate progress
towards global and regional immunization goals, but to provide added technical support for member states. Introduction of pneumococcal and
rotavirus vaccines and the prevention of measles infection will help decrease the burden of pneumonia and diarrhoea, moving the Region towards
success in implementing its Regional Child Survival Strategy.
To eliminate measles regionally by 2012 and reduce the threat of importation and subsequent spread, countries and areas will need to identify and
respond to any residual chains of measles virus transmission. This will require 1) an implementable action plan to interrupt measles virus trans-
mission in remaining groups at risk, and 2) improvement of surveillance performance to ensure timely laboratory or epidemiologic confirmation of
cases, measles virus identification, periodic epidemiologic analysis, and ultimately, verification of measles elimination. High level political
commitment will be critical to ensure the human and financial resources necessary to achieve the goal. Measles elimination activities may
simultaneously address rubella control whenever possible, and countries and areas that have not yet introduced rubella containing vaccine should
consider doing so in line with the recent WHO position paper.
Achieving regional Hepatitis B control will require increasing coverage with 3 timely doses of Hepatitis B vaccine (HepB), including a dose within
24 hours of birth, in the 9 countries that will not achieve the 2012milestone. The need to increase timelyHepB birth dose coverage offers an opportunity
to simultaneously strengthen neonatal andmaternal health care. Countries and areas that have achieved adequate HepB coverage during the past 5 years
should conduct serologic surveys to measure impact and initiate the regional process of verifying reduced chronic infection rates among children.
All countries and areas must remain vigilant to identify and respond to the threat of poliovirus importations. Poliomyelitis risk assessments should
be regularly conducted at the sub-national level, and actions should be taken to ensure adequate levels of population immunity and surveillance
performance. VPD laboratory networks continue to be strengthened by laboratory hands on training workshops and regularly assessed by on-site
review to maintain accreditation status.
Joint resource mobilization initiatives have been undertaken for all targeted vaccine preventable disease initiatives. WHO will continue to provide
technical support and seek additional financial support on behalf of member states for these and other EPI needs.
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A virus (IAV) hemagglutinin (HA) initiates infection by attaching virus to host cell surface sialic acids and catalysing the fusion of viral and cellular
membranes. The neuraminidase (NA) ends the infectious cycle by releasing nascent virions from the infected cell surface. Antibodies (Abs) to HA
block viral entry and play a critical role in immunity following infection or vaccination. Due to the rapid appearance of HA-escape mutants in
human populations, vaccines must be constantly reformulated. To better understand antigenic drift, we are modelling IAV infections in mice and
guinea pigs. Our findings indicate that antigenic drift is likely to be more than direct escape from neutralizing antibodies. Instead, they point to a key
role for HA binding avidity for host cell sialic acid receptors, and an oft-neglected feature of antibody mediated neutralization: it represents a ternary
competition between receptor and antibody for virus. Facing a partially neutralizing antibody response, virus can escape by increasing receptor
avidity. Partial neutralization must be a common occurrence in nature due to variability in human immune responses and infection with drifted
variants that demonstrate fractional escape from the Ab response to (un-drifted) parent. Predictably, increased viral receptor avidity incurs fitness
costs in vivo. Re-passage of adsorptive mutants in naı¨ve mice selected HA-single substitution mutants with diminished receptor avidity. Despite the
lack of Ab pressure, some of the substitutions occurred in antigenic regions. That single substitutions in the HA globular domain simultaneously
Abstracts S5modulate antigenicity and receptor binding, confounds retrospective analysis of genetic variation in HA. The situation is complicated further by the
occurrence of epistatic changes within HA and between HA and NA to maximizeviral fitness following selection. Moreover, substitutions selected
to modulate receptor avidity will inevitably modify receptor specificity for various sialic acid terminated-glycans and vice versa. From leaves to
forest: even in the simplest species (viruses), evolution is complicated, and oversimplified analysis leads to all sorts of errors, including those with
practical ramifications in interpreting sequences for choosing vaccine strains.
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Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was relatively mild with less severe disease burdens and social impact. Pandemic (H1N1)pdm09 virus itself was low
pathogenic, similar to seasonal flu viruses and different from H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses. Most people had acquired immunity
to Spanish flu or former seasonal H1N1 flu viruses, which was cross-protective, in part, against H1N1pdm09 virus. The pandemic started in the
North America, where US CDC detected and identified the causative virus rapidly, sharing information with WHO to take immediate responses.
Most countries had been prepared, more or less, against a possible pandemic by H5N1. H1N1pdm09 virus hardly underwent antigenic drift and the
pandemic vaccine remained matched and effective. The virus was susceptible to neuraminidase inhibitors and drug-resistant viruses did not spread,
unlike former seasonal H1N1 virus during 2007-2009. The pandemic virus did not increase the pathogenicity, unlike Spanish flu in 1918/19. Finally,
disease burdens and social impact remained far below previous assumptions against a possible H5N1 pandemic. On the other hand, pandemic
vaccine production and supply were delayed and insufficient and much confusion occurred due to misleading by health authorities and media. It
appeared clear that implementation of pandemic preparedness plans had been suboptimal in many settings.
During the pandemic (H1N1)2009, H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza continued to spread in several areas causing human infections. WHO is
keeping its pandemic alert level Phase 3. Both H1N1pdm09 and H5N1 viruses were shown to infect pigs in China and Indonesia and therefore, gene
reassortment between the viruses may occur in pigs or humans. Risk of an H5 pandemic still remains or is increasing, which will cause extremely
heavy disease burdens and social disruptions.
We should also learn much from the devastating earthquakes and tsunami and the resultant nuclear power plant accident, which occurred at much
severer levels far beyond the government’s “optimistic assumptions”, bases for the suboptimal preparedness. The worst thing we can do is not
prepare for a worst case scenario and think it will not happen. We must be prepared against a worst-case scenario of pandemic influenza caused by
a highly pathogenic virus.
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Pandemic influenza poses a serious threat to global health and the world economy. Highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus (HPAIV) of the H5N1
subtype that has emerged since 2004, resulted in more than 430 cases in 15 countries with a 50% case-fatality rate. Novel vaccine strategies for early
response include the use of attenuated vaccines/vectors administered via novel mucosal immunization routes, therapeutic anti-virals and passive
immunization with virus-specific antibodies (Abs).
The current influenza vaccines designed for inducing antibody (Ab) responses against viral surface antigens (i.e., hemagglutinin [HA] and
neuraminidase [NA]) are limited to seasonal use because of the ability of the virus to mutate these major antigenic glycoproteins. Vaccines
that target determinants conserved among influenza A viruses (IAV) to generate broad protection against infection with different influenza
A subtypes (i.e., heterosubtypic immunity [HSI]) remain elusive. We have currently developed a recombinant adenovirus (Ad) vector
co-encoding HA (H5 subtype) and a conserved ectodomain of matrix protein 2 (M2e) (AdH5/M2e) for induction of protective immunity to
H5N1 and other subtypes. Another approach based on the use of influenza virus carrying a deletion in the nonstructural NS1 gene is being
explored. Since NS1 enables the virus to disarm the host type 1 IFN response, such deletion leads to attenuation of the viruses and enhanced
host antiviral response. Therefore, vaccines based on NS1 deleted viruses (DelNS1) may provide better protection than inactivated vaccines
and could induce HSI to infection with different influenza virus A subtypes. Sub-lingual immunization has been found to be a safe and
effective route for induction of protective immune responses in systemic and mucosal compartments including respiratory tract. We found that
sublingual immunization with either AdH5/M2e or DelNS1 induces broad protective immunity to H5 viruses and other influenza virus A
subtypes including H1N1.
Passive immunization (the transfer of specific immunoglobulins/Abs to a previously nonimmune recipient host) could offer an alternative strategy to
prevent and treat influenza virus infection and an additional therapeutic option to antiviral drugs that are limited by widespread drug resistance
among influenza virus strains. Even after targeted vaccines become available, passive immunization could still have prophylactic effects and
provides an additional countermeasure against influenza, especially for individuals who do not respond well to the vaccines. Attempts to develop
monoclonal Abs (mAbs) have been made. However, passive immunization based on mAbs may require a cocktail of mAbs with broader specificity
in order to provide full protection since mAbs are generally specific for single epitopes. Because the recent epidemic of highly pathogenic avian
